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Abstract
Background: One of the objectives of the health transformation plan (HTP) in Iran is to reduce out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payments for inpatient services and eradicate informal payments. The HTP has three phases: the first phase 
(launched in May 5, 2014) is focused on reducing OOP payments for inpatient services; the second phase (launched 
in May 22, 2014) is focused on primary healthcare (PHC) and the third phase utilizes an updated relative value units 
for health services (launched in September 29, 2014) and is focused on the elimination of informal payments. This 
aim of this study was to determine the OOP payments and the frequency of informal cash payments to physicians 
for inpatient services before and after the HTP in Kurdistan province, Iran.
Methods: This quasi-experimental study used multistage sampling method to select and evaluate 265 patients 
discharged from hospitals in Kurdistan province. The study covered 3 phases (before the HTP, after the first, and 
third phases of the HTP). Part of the data was collected using a hospital information system form and the rest were 
collected using a questionnaire. Data were analyzed using Fisher exact test, logistic regression, and independent 
samples t test.
Results: The mean OOP payments before the HTP and after the first and third phases, respectively, were US$59.4, 
US$17.6, and US$14.3 in hospital affiliated to the Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME), US$39.6, 
US$33.7, and US$13.7 in hospitals affiliated to Social Security Organization (SSO), and US$153.3, US$188.7, and 
US$66.4 in private hospitals. In hospitals affiliated to SSO and MoHME there was a significant difference between 
the mean OOP payments before the HTP and after the third phase (P < .05). The percentage of informal payments 
to physicians in hospitals affiliated to MoHME, SSO, and private sector, respectively, were 4.5%, 8.1%, and 12.5% 
before the HTP, and 0.0%, 7.1%, and 10.0% after the first phase. Contrary to the time before the HTP, no informal 
payment was reported after the third phase.
Conclusion: It seems that the implementation of the HTP has reduced the OOP payments for inpatient services and 
eradicated informal payments to physician in Kurdistan province. 
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Implications for policy makers
• It seems that the implementation of the health transformation plan (HTP) reduced the mean out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for inpatient 
services in Kurdistan province, Iran.
• After the implementation of the third phase of the HTP, during the study period, we did not found any informal cash payments to physicians 
for inpatient services.
• Several factors significantly increased the probability of informal payments to physician including the followings: being discharged from private 
sector and social security hospitals, being discharged from hospitals before the implementation of the HTP, living in rural areas, being visited 
by an ophthalmologist, urologist or otolaryngologists. 
• Health policy-makers should pay attention to patients’ payments for “bought and brought health care goods” purchased from out-of-hospital 
supply chain.
Implications for the public
After the implementation of the health transformation plan (HTP), the amount of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for inpatient services was reduced. 
Reduction of OOP payments for inpatient services improves people’s access to such services and enhances the equity.  After the implementation of 
the third phase of the HTP no informal cash payments to physician was reported. The elimination of informal payments reduces the probability of 
corruption in the health system.
Key Messages 
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Background 
The share of out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments in total 
health expenditures and the subsequent catastrophic health 
expenditures (CHEs) are the 2 important factors that should 
be taken into account while planning and designing health 
policies.1,2 Too much reliance on OOP payments prevents 
countries from reaching universal health coverage (UHC).3-6 
Heavy reliance on OOP payments deprives millions of people 
from receiving healthcare services when they are in need of 
such services.3 OOP payment is the most unfair and inefficient 
method of financing in the health sector and could lead to 
an increase in poverty.4 Globally, about 150 million people 
are faced with CHE because of OOP payments to the health 
sector, of whom about 100 million people are pushed below 
the poverty line.7 However, OOP payments are common in 
most of developing countries for different reasons such as 
the lack or inefficiency of health insurance system, low share 
of health budget from the total budget of governments, and 
low government budgets. As a consequence, these types of 
payments are the main source of financing of the health sector 
for 33 countries. In such countries more than 50% of total 
healthcare expenditures are financed via OOP payments.3,8 
The distribution of the burden of OOP payments among 
different income groups is regressive because low-income 
groups, compared with the high-income groups, allocate a 
greater share of their income to pay for the health services 
expenditures.9,10 Utilization of prepayment schemes, such as 
health insurance, can reduce OOP payments and decrease the 
risk of CHEs.3,11,12 OOP payments are the sum of all payments 
by patients for outpatient and inpatient health services which 
are not reimbursed by patient’s health insurance company. 
Moreover, OOP payments for inpatient services include all 
direct payments by patients for receiving hospital inpatient 
care services.3,13,14
Generally, there are 2 types of OOP payments for inpatient 
services in Iran, including (1) formal payments in and out of 
hospitals at the point of receiving hospital care services and 
(2) informal payments to healthcare providers.13,15,16 In Iran, 
informal patient payment is defined as a cash or in-kind 
supplement to the official payment.15,16 Informal payments 
usually occur outside the official payment channels.15,17,18 
Because of 3 characteristics of information asymmetry, 
uncertainty, and the large number of actors, the health sector 
is at an increased risk of corruption.19 
The literature suggests different reasons for receiving and 
giving informal patient payments in the health systems, 
including the followings: low government investment in 
the health sector, unrealistic tariffs, lack of transparency 
and oversight in the health sector, monopoly, defects of 
insurance organizations, poor management, low salaries of 
health service providers, poor quality of health services, and 
cultural characteristics of a community.20-22 These payments 
can also lead to many negative consequences including the 
followings: lack of poor people’s access to health services, 
increased inequality in the utilization of health services, poor 
people’s unwillingness or delay in the utilization of services, 
promotion of useless and non-essential services, demolishing 
the social status of physicians, and harms to the physician-
patient relationship.21-25 
Informal patient payment is common and prevalent in 
many low- and middle-income countries and has become a 
challenge for health policy-makers.17,26 The results of a study 
on 29 developing countries with transitional economies 
showed that the frequency of informal payments among users 
of healthcare services ranged from 3.0% in Peru to 96.0% 
in Pakistan.20 According to a study conducted in Greece in 
2008, 36.0% of patients admitted to hospitals affiliated to the 
reported at least one case of informal payments to physicians. 
Of those, 42.0% of patients had an informal payment due 
to the fear of receiving sub-standard care while 20.0% paid 
informally due to physicians request.27 
To afford OOP payments, poor households usually use 
different methods such as selling assets and borrowing from 
relatives and banks.20,28 Recently, there has been increasing 
efforts and cooperation among policy-makers, planners, and 
donors in the health sector to combat corruption in the health 
sector.18 While designing strategies to fight informal patient 
payments and other forms of corruption, it is necessary to 
consider the texture and specific problems of the health 
sector.18,29 According to the results of studies in various 
countries, the increased awareness of citizens about informal 
payments and the methods of reporting such practices can 
have positive effects on reducing informal payments and 
corruption in the health sector.29,30 Governments around the 
world initiated the process of health sector reforms to protect 
households from the risk of impoverishment due to OOP 
expenses for healthcare services.31 Health sector reform in the 
Africa is focused on new methods of financing, organizing, 
managing, and implementing social insurance programs.32,33 
The transition economies of Eastern Europe have proposed 
many new social insurance schemes.34 Some countries have 
had some achievements to solve this problem.31,35 Since 2003, 
Turkey has brought about a series of reforms in the health 
sector which are managed under the health transformation 
program (HTP); this program is aimed at achieving UHC, 
reducing OOP payment, decreasing health inequalities in co-
financing healthcare expenditures, increasing people’s access 
to health services, and improving health outcomes.36
An Overview of Iran Healthcare System
In Iran, primary healthcare (PHC) services are financed and 
provided by the government across the country through 
a widespread PHC network. The second and third level 
services are provided by the public, semi-public, and private 
sectors. Iran has 3 main insurance organizations including 
the Iranian Health Insurance Organization (IHIO), Social 
Security Organization (SSO), and Armed Forces Insurance 
Organization (AFIO). IHIO and SSO have multiple insurance 
schemes, which cover both compulsory and optional 
insurances, while the AFIO schemes are only compulsory. In 
recent years, despite growing developments in the healthcare 
system in Iran, the equitable financing has been one of the 
major challenges faced by the country’s health system.2 Some 
of the problems in this area are as follows:
·	 High share of OOP payments in the total healthcare 
expenditures: The fifth economic, social, and cultural 
development plan of Iran has emphasized on reducing 
OOP payments and CHE to less than 30.0% and 1.0%, 
respectively,37 however, in recent years the share of OOP 
payments has raised and accounted for over 50.0% of the 
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total healthcare expenditures.38 Moreover, according to 
the studies conducted in different parts of the country, 
the percentage of households exposed to CHE has been 
between 8.3%-22.0%.2,13,39,40
·	 Low share of the health budget in the total budget of 
the government: in recent years before the HTP (May 
2014), the governmental budget allocated to the health 
sector has been less than 8.0% of the total budget of the 
government.37,41
·	 Inefficiency of national insurance system in three 
dimensions of the total population under the coverage 
(Breadth), services under the coverage (Depth), and the 
level of financial support for services (Height): According 
to a report by the National Institutes of Health Research, 
17.0% of households were not under the coverage of any 
health insurance system in 2010.42 In addition, according 
to a report by the Iranian National Health Accounts in 
2008, the three main insurance organizations in Iran, ie, 
IHIO, SSO and AFIO, respectively, incurred 6.6%, 10.9%, 
and 1.5% of the total healthcare expenditures, which 
indicated the inefficiency of insurers in covering the 
costs of services. Thus, the largest part of the healthcare 
expenditures in Iran is paid by the households.37,41
·	 The prevalence of informal payments in the health sector: 
despite the illegal nature of informal payments, this type of 
payments has been reported in the health sector in recent 
years. According to a study in 2013, 11.2% of physicians 
had received informal payments from hospitalized 
patients. The mean informal payments received by 
physicians with different specialization were as follows: 
US$150 by gynaecology and obstetrics specialists, 
US$286.9 by general surgery specialists, US$250 by 
internal medicine and neurology specialist, US$31.3 
by nephrologists, US$812.5 by orthopaedic specialist, 
US$450.6 by otolaryngology specialists.15 According 
to some other studies in Iran, from the perspective of 
practitioners, policy-makers, and patients, the major 
causes of informal payments are: cultural factors, factors 
related to the quality of services, inefficiency of the health 
system, unrealistic tariffs, direct financial relationship 
between physicians and patients, and financial weakness 
of insurance agencies.21,22
As mentioned above, in recent years, there have been many 
driving forces to reform the health sector in Iran, but the 
greatest obstacle facing the reform is the lack of political 
support.43 Nevertheless, the eleventh presidential cabinet 
has paid a special attention to the health sector. Political and 
financial supports have been provided by the government 
and parliament to reform the health sector. Accordingly, the 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) has 
started the HTP since May 5, 2014, to conduct a series of 
reforms to increase equity and reach UHC in Iran.44
What Is the Health Transformation Plan in Iran? 
The HTP includes a series of reforms that has been 
implementing in three phases since May 5, 2014 in Iran. 
The first phase of the HTP focused on hospitals affiliated 
to MoHME, the second phase with a focus on PHC started 
on May 22, 2014; this phase was not covered by our study as 
this phase was not expected to affect inpatients’ payments, at 
least in a short run. The third phase, which updated tariffs 
of health services, began on September 29, 2014 and it was 
implemented in all parts of the health system. In recent years, 
the majority of physicians have complained about unrealistic 
tariffs as the main reason for receiving informal payments. 
With the implementation of the third phase of the HTP, 
universities of medical sciences began a strict monitoring on 
the health service tariffs, so that to avoid requests for extra 
payments. Paying fines, calling off the contracts by insurance 
companies, firing the presidents of public hospitals, lowering 
the hospital accreditation grade, and reimbursing patients’ 
payments are among the punishments for those who receive 
informal payments.45,46 Different intervention and main 
objectives of the HTP are listed in Table 1.
The HTP is financed through the annual budget allocated by 
the MoHME; it also receives 10.0% of revenue coming from 
targeted subsidies and 1.0% of value added tax system.45 
Along with the reforms in the health system, various aspects 
of the system need to be monitored and evaluated. Timely 
monitoring and evaluation of reforms can provide evidence 
required for (re) directing the reforms.31,33 There is not much 
accurate information about the extent and frequency of 
informal payments in Iran and no study has been conducted 
yet to assess the impact of the HTP on OOP payments. Given 
that the HTP has been one of the most important social 
programs of the government, monitoring and evaluation of the 
program can provide many lessons for health system policy-
makers. As the first official report on hospitalized patients’ 
OOP payment after the implementation of the HTP in Iran, 
this study aimed to determine the extent of OOP payments 
and frequency of informal cash payment to physicians for 
inpatient services before and after the implementation of the 
HTP and its influencing factors in Kurdistan province, Iran. 
In this study OOP payment for inpatient services was defined 
as all direct payments made by hospitalized patients for 
healthcare services, drugs, and diagnostics services in and out 
of hospitals, and also informal cash payments to physicians 
The findings of this study can provide a feedback to the 
healthcare policy-makers to assess the HTP and, if necessary, 
improve its implementation.
Methods
Study Design
This research was conducted as a quasi-experimental study. 
Quasi-experimental studies include a wide range of non-
randomized intervention studies. This type of study is 
conducted when the use of controlled trial is limited due to 
logistics or ethical issues. The “simulated before and after” 
design or the “separate sample pretest-posttest design” are 
among the most common quasi-experimental designs.47,48 This 
study design is used for studying large populations where it is 
not possible to randomize the intervention between different 
groups,49 and equivalent samples are selected randomly 
before and after the intervention.48 Our study covered three 
time periods: before the implementation of the HTP, after the 
implementation of the first phase of the HTP, and after the 
implementation of the third phase of the HTP.
Study Population
The population of this study included all patients discharged 
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from all hospitals across Kurdistan province (including 12 
hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, 2 hospitals affiliated 
to the SSO, and 1 private hospital) during the three time 
periods: December 22, 2013 to March 20, 2014 (before 
the implementation of the HTP), 3 months after the 
implementation of the first phase (May 22, 2014 to August 
21, 2014), and 3 months after the implementation of the third 
phase of the HTP (October 23, 2014 to January 20, 2015).
Sample Size and Sampling Methods
Considering α = .05 (type 1 error), d = 0.04 (minimal 
detectable deference) and p = 11.2% (the percentage of 
informal payments to physicians for inpatient services) and 
using the equation (1), the target sample size of this study was 
calculated to be 265 patients.
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As there was the risk of low response rate and to perform a 
one-time sampling to prevent subsequent errors, the sample 
size was increased to 300 patients. Sampling was done 3 times 
(before the first phase of the HTP, after the first phase of the 
HTP, and after the third phase of the HTP) using multi-stage 
sampling by hospital type. First, considering the ownership 
of the hospitals in Kurdistan province, they were classified 
into three strata, each affiliated to private sector, SSO, and 
the MoHME, respectively. Then, one hospital affiliated to the 
private sector, one hospital affiliated to SSO, and four hospitals 
affiliated to the MoHME were randomly selected. In the 
second stage, the sample size was calculated in proportion to 
the number of patients discharged of each hospital. A total of 
300 patients were selected via a systematic sampling method. 
Accordingly, first we used the hospital health information 
system to calculate the total number of patients discharged 
from each of the three groups of hospitals during the desired 
time periods; in proportion to the calculated numbers, the 
share of each group of hospitals (from a total of 300 samples) 
was calculated. Then, to calculate the constant interval, we 
divided the total number of patients in each group of hospitals 
by the number calculated in the previous step. Subsequently, a 
starting point was selected randomly and subsequent samples 
were selected based on constant interval. Data collection was 
started from the first person on the list and it continued until 
the time a total of 265 patients were contacted and interviewed 
via phone calls. In order to reach the target sample size 
(265 patients) – as some persons on the list did not answer 
Table 1. Interventions and objectives of Iran’s HTP
Phase Interventions Objectives
First
• Providing basic health insurance free of charge by the Iran Health Insurance Organization for all Iranians 
without any health insurance coverage and covering some of the services that were not previously covered 
by the service packages of basic insurance systems.
• Reducing the share of OOP payments to 3%-6% of the total costs of inpatient services in public hospitals; 
preventing the referral of patients (in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME) to the centers out of the supply 
chain for the purchase of medicines, supplies, equipment, and laboratory and imaging services.
• Supporting the retention of physicians in underserved areas in order to increase people’s access to health 
services; eliminating informal payments; attracting and preserving the physicians in these areas through 
incentive payments.
• Providing financial supports for patients with special and incurable diseases and also for poor patients.
• Improving the quality of hoteling in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME through different interventions such 
as improving hospital amenities, lodging services, and hospital food services.
• Improving the quality of visit services in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME through incentive payments to 
physicians in order to increase the motivations of the healthcare providers, preserve physicians in the public 
sector, and increase patient satisfaction.
• Increasing the presence of resident physicians in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME through incentive 
payments to physicians in order to increase people’s access to on-time and 24-hour medical care services.
• Providing free services for natural childbirth with the aim of promoting natural delivery.
• Reducing OOP payments
• Reducing the percentage of 
households facing CHE
• Increasing the rate of 
natural delivery
• Increasing the 
responsiveness of the 
health system
Second
• Improving healthcare services in villages and towns with less than 20 thousand inhabitants through 
recruiting physicians, midwives, and other human resources needed to provide services in rural health 
centers in underprivileged areas, and adding new drugs to previous list of drugs.
• Providing PHC services for a population of over 8.5 to 10 million people who live in suburbs. This population 
previously has had no access to PHC. In suburbs, there should be a physician per 8 to 15 thousand people, a 
dietitian per 30 to 50 thousand people, and a psychologist and their experts in laboratory sciences.
• Continuing family physician pilot program in two provinces of Fars and Mazandaran, Iran.
• Extending family physician program to cities with a population of 20 to 50 thousand people.
• Implementing the national plan for promoting and developing self-care.
• Strengthening and institutionalizing intra-sectoral cooperation in the field of health at the national, 
provincial, and city leve.  
• Providing access to PHC 
services for all people
• Improving health indicators
• Improving the quality of 
services
• Providing comprehensive 
and integrated services
• Designing a hierarchy for 
services and referral system
Third
• Using an updated relative value units for medical services.
• Introducing a dedicated hotline (telephone number: 1690) and a website (http://www.1690.ir) to report any 
violation and disobedience.
• Creating real justice in 
payments for various 
medical specialty services
• More realistic medical 
tariffs
• Eliminating informal patient 
payments
Abbreviations: OOP, out-of-pocket; HTP, health transformation plan; PHC, primary healthcare; MoHME, Ministry of Health and Medical Education; CHE, 
catastrophic health expenditures.
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the phone calls – a total of 294, 297, and 296 patients were 
contacted (from a list of 300 people) for the first, second, and 
third phases, respectively. In the first and second periods of 
sampling, before and after the first phase of implementation 
of the HTP, the hospitals affiliated to the private sector and 
SSO were selected as the control groups and the hospitals 
affiliated to the MoHME were selected as the cases, because 
the first phase of the HTP had made no intervention for the 
hospitals affiliated to the private sector and SSO.
Research Instruments and Data Collection
Data about the patients’ demographic characteristics, type 
of health insurance, hospital stay, and physician expertise, 
as well as data on the total cost of hospitalization (classified 
into insurance share, health subsidies share, and OOP 
patients share) were extracted from a form registered in the 
HIS. Moreover, the other data about the patients’ location 
and education, informal payments to physicians, other 
expenses to buy medicine, supplies, equipment, laboratory 
tests, and imaging services outside the supply chain were 
collected through a questionnaire using telephone interviews 
with patients or their parents (for the patients younger 
than 18 years of age). In this study, the required data was 
only collected from patients who were discharged from the 
hospital; however, because of patient’s conditions as well as 
cultural context of Iran, there was a low chance of answering 
the questions by the patients and their families. Thus, in order 
to communicate better and freely with the patients and their 
families, answer their questions about the questionnaire, 
help them write their responses if they were illiterate, and 
reduce any inconveniences, data collection was performed 
via telephone interviews (as used in many other similar 
international studies). If a patient did not cooperate or did 
not answer after three calls, he/she was randomly replaced 
with another patient from the list. The validity and reliability 
of the questionnaire was confirmed in a study by a previous 
study.15 Phone number of the patients were obtained from the 
hospitals’ HIS system. The samples were selected in February 
2015 and their data registered on all the three desired periods 
were extracted from the hospital HIS systems; in addition, 
phone calls were made during the same month.
Statistical Analysis
Using frequency, percentage, and mean, the data was 
described. Fisher exact test was used to compare the difference 
in the percentage of informal payments to physicians before 
and after the implementation of the HTP. Multiple logistic 
regression was used was used to simultaneously evaluate the 
relationship between informal payment and independent 
variables and control the contextual variables. Taking into 
account P removal = 0.1, backward elimination method was 
used to build the regression model. In addition, Independent 
sample t test was used to evaluate the difference in mean OOP 
payments by patients before and after the implementation of 
the HTP. Data were analyzed using SPSS 20 software. The 
significance level was set at .05.
Results 
The response rate in the first, second, and third phase of 
sampling, was 90.1% (265 out of 294 people), 89.2% (265 
out of 297 people), and 89.5% (265 out of 296 people) 
respectively. The mean age (standard deviation, SD) of the 
studied people at each phase of the study, respectively, was 
44.9 (40) years, 42.5 (38) years, and 41.6 (38) years. Table 2 
shows the demographic characteristics of the patients studied 
at different phases of the study.
Informal Payments to Physician 
The first phase of the HTP was implemented only in the 
hospitals affiliated to the MoHME. At this phase, hospitals 
not affiliated to the MoHME (private and social security 
hospitals) were considered as the control groups. The 
percentages of informal cash payments to physicians before 
and after the implementation of the first phase of the HTP, 
were 12.5% and 10.0% in private hospitals, 8.1% and 7.1% in 
social security hospitals, and 4.5% and 0.0% in the hospitals 
affiliated to the MoHME respectively. Fisher exact test was 
used to compare the difference in the percentage of informal 
cash payments to physician before the first phase and after 
the third phase of the HTP. In comparison with the time 
before the implementation of the HTP, after the first phase 
the percentage of informal cash payments to physicians was 
significantly reduced only in the hospitals affiliated to the 
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of the Study Population
Variables
Phase of the Study
Before the HTP 
No. (%)
After the First Phase of the HTP 
No. (%)
After the Third Phase of the HTP 
No. (%)
Gender
Male 117 (44.2) 112 (42.3) 115 (43.4)
Female 148 (55.8) 153 (57.7) 150 (56.6)
Level of education
Illiterate 71 (26.8) 52 (19.6) 41 (15.5)
Low literacy 114 (43.0) 117 (44.2) 115 (43.4)
Average 57 (21.5) 65 (24.5) 71 (26.8)
University 23 (8.7) 31 (11.7) 38 (14.3)
Basic insurance status
Yes 259 (97.3) 265 (100.0) 265 (100.0)
No 6 (2.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Mean length of stay (SD) 3.7 (2.8) days 3.8 (2.9) days 3.8 (2.5) days
Abbreviations: HTP, health transformation plan; SD, standard deviation.
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MoHME (P = .000). However, the third phase of the HTP 
was implemented in all the healthcare centers in the country. 
After the initiation of this phase, no informal cash payment to 
physicians was reported. In comparison with the time before 
the HTP, after the third phase the percentage of informal cash 
payments to physicians was significantly reduced in all the 
studied hospitals (P = .000; Table 3).
The results showed that regardless of the period of the study, 
94.4% of inpatients (17 out of 18 cases) who practiced informal 
payments to physicians underwent a surgery regardless of the 
type of hospitals, 10.7% of those undergoing surgery before 
the HTP had practiced informal payments to physicians. This 
was reduced to 3.5% after the implementation of the first 
phase of the HTP. Fisher exact Test was used to compare the 
difference in the percentage of informal cash payments to 
physician before the first phase and after the third phase of 
the HTP, based on studied variables (Table 4).
Frequency of Patients Who Referred to out of the Hospital 
The results showed that of all patients hospitalized in hospitals 
affiliated to the MoHME, SSO, and private sector, respectively, 
43.6%, 29.7%, and 25.0% before the implementation of the 
HTP, 2.3%, 21.4%, and 0.0% after the first phase, and 1.9%, 
20.9%, and 0.0% after the third phase were referred at least 
once to the centers out of the hospital supply chain to purchase 
medicines, supplies, and equipments, and receive laboratory 
and imaging service (Table 5).
Factors Effecting Informal Payments to Physician 
Multiple logistic regression models were used to assess the 
simultaneous effects of variables on informal payments to 
physicians. The percentage of hospitalized patients who had 
informal payments to physician is the dependent variable. 
The independent variables were the followings: period of the 
study, type of hospital, location of residence, type of basic 
insurance used by the, status of supplementary insurance 
used by the patient, household income, and type of physician’s 
specialty (Appendix 1). These variables were entered into 
multiple logistic regression models and analyzed using the 
backward elimination method (Table 6). The results showed 
that the odds ratio (OR) of informal payments to physicians 
declined after the implementation of the HTP. For example, 
patients who were hospitalized after the HTP were 70.0% less 
likely to practice unofficial payment than those hospitalized 
before it (OR = 0.3, CI = 0.1-1.1).
Those discharged from the private sector and social security 
hospitals were about 4.5 times more likely to pay unofficially 
to physician than those discharged from hospitals affiliated 
to the MoHME (OR = 4.6, CI = 1.3-16.0). In addition, the OR 
of informal payments to physicians for people living in rural 
areas was almost 3.5 times higher than those living in urban 
settings (OR = 3.6, CI = 1.1-16.0).
Type of basic insurance scheme had an impact on the OR of 
informal payments to physicians. Compared with those under 
the coverage of medical services insurance, patients under 
the coverage of social security insurance and those under the 
coverage of other types of insurance, respectively, were more 
and less likely to practice informal payments to physicians. 
Moreover, patients with supplementary insurance were more 
prone to informal payments to physicians than those without 
supplementary insurance (OR = 0.8, CI = 0.1-8.8).
Patients living in the households with a monthly income of 
more than 30 million Rial (equal to US$850) were about two 
times more prone to informal payments than those with a 
monthly income of less than 10 million Rial (equal to US$280) 
(OR = 2.0, CI = 0.2-19.8). In addition, patients living in the 
households with monthly income of 10 to 20 Rial were less 
likely to pay unofficially than those with a monthly income of 
less than 10 million Rial (OR = 0.2, CI = 0.0-1.7).
Hospitalized patients who received services form nephrologists, 
ophthalmologist, urologists, and otolaryngologists were 
4.2 times more prone to informal payments to physicians 
compared to other patients receiving gynecology services 
(OR = 4.3, CI = 1.1-16.5).
Cost of Inpatient Hospitalization and Out-of-Pocket Payment
Table 7 presents the extent and percentage of hospital costs by 
types of cost, hospital, and time period.
The mean (SD) OOP payment per every patient hospitalized 
in the hospitals affiliated to the MoHME before the 
implementation of the HTP, and after the first and third 
phases of the HTP, respectively, was US$59.4 (80.8), US$17.6 
(18.5), and US$14.3 (18.9). There were significant differences 
between the mean OOP payment before the implementation 
of the first phase with that after the first phase of the HTP 
(P = .000) and after the third phase of the HTP (P = .000).
In addition, the mean (SD) OOP payment per every patient 
hospitalized in hospital affiliated to the SSO before the 
implementation of the HTP, and after the first third phases 
of the HTP, respectively, was US$39.6 (63.9), US$33.7 (45.7), 
Table 3. The Frequency and Percentage of Informal Payments to Physicians Based on Type of Hospital in Different Periods of the study
Type of Hospital
Informal 
Payment
Period of the study
P Valuea
Before the HTP After the First Phase of HTP P Valuea After the Third Phase of HTP
Private
Yes (%) 1 (12.5) 1 (10.0)
1.000
0 (0.0)
1.000
No (%) 7 (87.5) 9 (90.0) 7 (100.0)
Social security
Yes (%) 3 (8.1) 3 (7.1)
1.000
0 (0.0)
.093
No (%) 34 (91.9) 39 (92.9) 43 (100.0)
Public
Yes (%) 10 (4.5) 0 (0.0)
.000
0 (0.0)
.000
No (%) 210 (95.5) 213 (100.0) 215 (100.0)
Total
Yes (%) 14 (5.3) 4 (1.5)
.022
0 (0.0)
.000
No (%) 251 (94.7) 261 (98.5) 265 (100.0)
Abbreviation: HTP, health transformation plan.
a Fisher exact test.
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and US$13.7 (14.7). There were no significant differences 
between the mean OOP payment before the implementation 
of the first phase with that after the first phase of the HTP 
(P = .644), however it was significantly different from the time 
after the third phase of the HTP (P = .022).
The mean (SD) OOP payment per every patient hospitalized 
in the private hospital before the implementation of the HTP, 
and after the first and third phases of the HTP, respectively, 
was US$153.3 (48.8), US$188.7 (239.2), and US$66.4 (166.0). 
There were no significant differences between the mean OOP 
payment before the implementation of the first phase with 
that after the first phase of the HTP (P = .652) and after the 
third phase of the HTP (P = .223).
The mean (SD) informal cash payments to physicians per 
every patient hospitalized in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME 
before the HTP was US$6.0 (33.0) which was reduced to zero 
after the implementation of the HTP. There was a significant 
difference between mean informal payments to physicians 
per every patient before and after the implementation of the 
HTP (P = .000).
Moreover, the mean (SD) informal cash payments to 
physicians per every patient hospitalized in the hospital 
affiliated to SSO before the implementation of the HTP, and 
after the first and third phases of the HTP, respectively, was 
US$6.5 (26.0), US$4.4 (17.5), and US$0 (0.0). There were no 
significant differences between the mean informal payments 
to physicians before the implementation of the first phase 
with that after the first phase of the HTP (P = .682) and after 
the third phase of the HTP (P = .131).
The mean (SD) informal cash payments to physicians per 
Table 4. The Frequency and Percentage of Informal Cash Payment to Physicians Based on Study Variables
Variables
Period of the Study
Before the HTP After the First Phase of HTP After The Third Phase of HTP
Informal Payment Informal Payment Informal Payment
Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%)
Gender
Malea 9 (7.7) 108 (92.3) 3 (2.7) 109 (97.3) 0.0 150 (100.0)
Femalea 5 (3.4) 143 (96.6) 1 (0.7) 152 (99.3) 0.0 115 (100.0)
Type of hospital
Private 1 (12.5) 7 (87.5) 1 (10.0) 9 (90.0) 0.0 7 (100.0)
Social security 3 (8.1) 34 (91.9) 3 (7.1) 39 (92.9) 0.0 43 (100.0)
Affiliated to MoHMEa 10 (4.5) 210 (95.5) 0 (0.0) 213 (100.0) 0.0 215 (100.0)
Location
Urbana 5 (2.8) 175 (97.2) 3 (1.4) 206 (98.6) 0.0 204 (100.0)
Rurala 9 (10.2) 76 (89.8) 1 (1.8) 55 (98.2) 0.0 61 (100.0)
Type of basic insurance
Medical servicesa 9 (6.3) 135 (93.7) 2 (1.4) 138 (98.6) 0.0 129 (100.0)
Social scurity 2 (2.2) 90 (97.8) 2 (2.1) 92 (97.9) 0.0 108 (100.0)
Other 3 (13.0) 20 (87.0) 0 (0.0) 31 (100.0) 0.0 28 (100.0)
Supplementary insurance
Have 1 (5.3) 18 (94.7) 1 (4.5) 21 (95.5) 0.0 21 (100.0)
Not havea 13 (5.3) 233 (94.7) 3 (1.2) 240 (98.8) 0.0 244 (100.0)
Household incomeb
<10 million Riala 12 (8.4) 131 (91.6) 3 (1.9) 158 (98.1) 0.0 207 (100.0)
10-30 million Rial 1 (1.0) 101 (99.0) 0 (0.0) 92 (100.0) 0.0 53 (100.0)
>30 million Rial 1 (5.0) 19 (95.0) 1 (8.3) 11 (91.7) 0.0 5 (100.0)
Specialty physician
Obstetrics and gynecology 3 (4.2) 68 (95.8) 1 (1.4) 70 (98.6) 0.0 76 (100.0)
General surgery 1 (5.0) 19 (95.0) 0 (0.0) 31 (100.0) 0.0 37 (100.0)
Pediatrics 0 (0.0) 19 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 21 (100.0) 0.0 19 (100.0)
Urologya 5 (21.7) 18 (78.3) 1 (4.0) 24 (96.0) 0.0 16 (100.0)
Orthopaedics 0 (0.0) 15 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 24 (100.0) 0.0 11 (100.0)
Otorhinolaryngology 1 (9.1) 10 (90.9) 1 (11.1) 8 (88.9) 0.0 10 (100.0)
Cardiology and pulmonology 0 (0.0) 29 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 13 (100.0) 0.0 22 (100.0)
Ophthalmology 4 (17.4) 19 (82.6) 1 (7.7) 12 (92.8) 0.0 20 (100.0)
Other 0 (0.0) 54 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 58 (100.0) 0.0 54 (100.0)
Type of treatment
With a surgerya 13 (10.6) 109 (89.4) 4 (3.5) 111 (96.5) 0.0 131 (100.0)
Without a surgery 1 (0.7) 142 (99.3) 0 (0.0) 150 (100.0) 0.0 134 (100.0)
Length of stay
1-2 daya 9 (8.7) 94 (71.3) 3 (2.7) 107 (97.3) 0.0 84 (100.0)
3-4 day 3 (3.1) 95 (96.9) 1 (1.2) 82 (98.8) 0.0 116 (100.0)
>5 day 2 (3.1) 62 (96.9) 0 (0.0) 72 (100.0) 0.0 65 (100.0)
Abbreviations: HTP, health transformation plan; MoHME, Ministry of Health and Medical Education.
a P value < .05, Results of Fisher exact test.   
b Exchange rate: 33810 Iranian Rial to US$1.0.
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every patient hospitalized in private hospital before the 
implementation of the HTP, and after the first and third 
phases of the HTP, respectively, was US$14.8 (41.8), US$59.1 
(187.1), and US$0.0 (0.0) There were no significant differences 
between the mean informal payments to physicians before 
the implementation of the first phase with that after the first 
phase of the HTP (P = .480) and after the third phase of the 
HTP (P = .352).
The mean percentages of OOP payments in hospitals affiliated 
to the MoHME, SSO, and private sector, respectively, were 
24.0%, 15.8%, and 30.5% before the HTP while they become 
5.8%, 10.8%, and 35.8% after the first phase, after the third 
phase of the HTP, the OOP payments of patients hospitalized 
in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, SSO, and the private 
sector accounted for 3.4%, 3.6%, and 6.5% of the total cost of 
hospitalization.
Of all patients hospitalized in hospitals affiliated to the 
MoHME, SSO, and private sector, respectively, 43.6%, 29.4%, 
and 25.0% before the implementation of the HTP, 2.3%, 22.0%, 
and 0.0% after the first phase, and 2.0%, 20.0%, and 0.0% after 
the third phase were referred at least once to the centers out 
of the hospital supply chain to purchase medicines, supplies, 
and equipments, and receive laboratory and imaging service. 
In hospitals affiliated to MoHME, there was a significant 
difference between out-of-hospital OOP payments before the 
HTP and after the HTP.
Table 5. The Frequency and Percentage of Patients Who Referred to Out of the Hospital Supply Chain Based on Type of Hospital in Different Periods of 
the Study
Type of Hospital
Referred to the Supply 
Chain of Hospital
Period of the Study
P Valuea
Before the HTP
After the First Phase 
of HTP
P Valuea After the Third Phase 
of HTP
Private
Yes (%) 2 (25.0) 0 (0.0)
.183
0 (0.0)
.466
No (%) 6 (75.0) 10 (100.0) 7 (100.0)
Social security
Yes (%) 11 (29.7) 8 (21.4)
.301
9 (20.9)
.441
No (%) 26 (70.3) 34 (78.6) 34 (79.1)
Public
Yes (%) 96 (43.6) 5 (2.3)
.000
4 (1.9)
.000
No (%) 124 (56.4) 208 (97.7) 211 (98.1)
Abbreviation: HTP, health transformation plan.
a Fisher exact test.
Table 6. Relationship Between Informal Payments to Physicians and the Studied Variables
Independent Variables OR
95% CI
Definition of the Variables
Lowest Highest
Period of the study
Before the HTPa - - - Reference category
After the first phase of the HTP 0.3 0.1 1.1
After the third phase of the HTP 0.1 0.0 0.6
Type of hospital
Affiliated to MoHME - - - Reference category
Not affiliated to MoHME 4.6 1.3 16.0 Including private and social security hospitals
Location
Urban - - - Reference category
Rural 3.6 1.1 11.2
Type of basic insurance
Medical services - - - Reference category
Social security 0.7 0.2 2.7
Other 1.5 0.3 7.1 Including Armed forces, Relief and Welfare Committee, banks
Supplementary insurance
Not have - - - Reference category
Have 0.8 0.1 8.8
Household income
<10 million Rial - - - Reference category
10-30 million Rial 0.2 0.0 1.7
>30 million Rial 2.0 0.2 19.8
Specialty of the physician
Obstetrics and gynecology - - - Reference category
General surgery, orthopaedics 0.6 0.1 6.6
Ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, urology 4.3 1.1 16.5
Other 0.2 0.0 2.5
Including pediatrics, cardiology, pulmonology, gastroenterology, endocrinology, 
hematology, oncology, internal medicine, infectious disease, neurology
Abbreviations: HTP, health transformation plan; MoHME, Ministry of Health and Medical Education.
a All the variables were compared with the Reference category; 2LL = 90.7a; Nagelkerke R square = 0.5.
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Table 7. The Cost of Inpatient OOP Payments by Type of Hospital and Period of the Study
Variables
Period of the study
After the third phase of the HTP After the first phase of the HTP Before the HTP
Type of hospital Type of hospital Type of hospital
Private Social Security Affiliated to MoHME Private Social Security Affiliated to MoHME Private Social Security Affiliated to MoHME
Cost per 
inpatientb 
Pa SD Mean 
(%)
Pa SD Mean 
(%)
Pa SD Mean 
(%)
Pa SD Mean 
(%)
Pa SD Mean 
(%)
Pa SD Mean 
(%)
SD Mean 
(%)
SD Mean 
(%)
SD Mean (%)
Formal OOP to 
hospital
0.462 166.0
66.4 
(6.5)
0.022 12.5 4.4 (1.2) .000 18.2
14.0 
(3.3)
.991 188.1
129.6 
(24.6)
0.861 41.3
17.7 
(5.7)
.000 18.6
17.3 
(5.7)
150.4
128.9 
(25.6)
37.9
19.2 
(7.7)
45.3 33.5 (13.6)
Formal 
payment out of 
hospital
0.314 0 0 0.251 8.2 9.3 (2.4) .000 2.3 0.3 
(0.1)
.311 0 0 0.612 16.2 11.5 
(3.7)
.000 1.9
0.3 
(0.1)
24.9
9.6 
(1.9)
22.4
13.8 
(5.5)
57.8 19.9 (8.1)
Informal 
payment to 
physician
0.352 0 0 0.131 0 0 .000 0 0 .480 187.1 59.1 
(11.2)
0.682 17.5
4.4 
(1.4)
.000 0 0 41.8 14.8 
(3.0)
26.0
6.5 
(2.6)
33.0 6.0 (2.3)
Total OOP 0.223 166.0
66.4 
(6.5)
0.022 14.7
13.7 
(3.6)
.000 18.9
14.3 
(3.4)
.652 239.2
188.7 
(35.8)
0.644 45.7
33.7 
(10.8)
.000 18.5
17.6 
(5.8)
48.4
153.3 
(30.5)
63.9
39.6 
(15.8)
80.8 59.4 (24.0)
Share of the  
HTP fund
- 0 0 - 0 0 .000 53.4 36.3 
(8.4)
- 0 0 - 0 0 .000 55.2 25.6 
(8.5)
0 0 0 0 0 0
Contribution of 
insurancec
0.001 204.1
959.9 
(93.5)
0.061 527.1
368.0 
(96.4)
.000 428.2
379.6 
(88.2)
.632 263 338.9 
(64.2)
0.261 338.3
279.3 
(89.2)
.021 389.4
260.1 
(85.7)
279.5
349.1 
(69.5)
156.6
211.5 
(84.2)
240.2
187.5 
(76.0)
Total cost 0.001 230.8
959.9 
(100) 0.021 185.6
381.6 
(100) .000 485.1
430.2 
(100) .841 336.3
527.6 
(100) 0.402 348.3
313.0 
(100) .000 418.3
336.8 
(100) 194.5
502.4 
(100) 300.1
251.1 
(100) 269.1
246.9 
(100)
Abbreviations: SD, standard deviation; HTP, health transformation plan; MoHME, Ministry of Health and Medical Education; OOP, Out-of-Pocket.
a Results of independent samples t test.
b Exchange rate: 33 810 Iranian Rial to US$ 1.0.
c Both of basic and supplementary insurance.
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Discussion 
The mean (SD) OOP payments before the HTP and after the 
third phase, respectively, were US$59.4 (80.8) and US$14.3 
(3.4) (P = .00) in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, US$39.6 
(63.9) and US$13.7 (14.7) (P = .02) in SSO hospitals, and 
US$153.3 (48.4) and US$66.4 (166.0) (P = .22) in private 
sector hospitals. The reduction of OOP can be attributed to 
different factors including increased coverage of inpatient 
expenditures by health insurances schemes, reduction 
of informal payments, providing free-of-charge natural 
childbirth services in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, 
utilization of the health transformation fund for paying 
part of hospitalization costs, and not referring patients 
hospitalized in the hospitals affiliated to the MoHME to 
purchase medicines, medical supplies, and diagnostic services 
out of the supply chain.44-46 The results of a study in Iran 
showed that the mean OOP payment of mothers who had a 
delivery in university hospitals was significantly reduced after 
HTP, as compared with the time before the HTP. According 
to the mentioned study, the mean OOP payment was US$29.5 
before implementing the HTP which decreased to US$9.9 
after the first phase and to US$10.2 after the third phase of 
the HTP.50 
The high levels of OOP payments can be economically 
catastrophic for the poor.3,45 In recent years and before the 
implementation of the HTP, a high proportion of households 
has been exposed to CHE in Iran.3,13,37,38 This happened 
because the insurance organizations failed to cover the costs, 
therefore, a large amount of the expenses for health services 
were compensated through OOP.2 The implementation of 
HTP reduced the volume of direct expenditures on health 
services in Turkey. Accordingly, the share of health spending 
as a proportion of non-food costs changed from 3.1% in 2003 
to 2.4% in 2011. In addition, the percentage of households 
faced with CHE was decreased by three times during the same 
period.36 
Our findings also showed that unlike the SSO and private 
sector hospitals, after the first phase of the HTP the 
percentage of informal cash payments to physicians was 
significantly reduced in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME 
(P = .00). The percentage of informal payments to physicians 
in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, Social Security and 
private sector, was 4.5%, 8.1%, and 12.5% respectively, before 
the implementation of the first phase of the HTP and 0.0%, 
7.1%, and 10.0% after the implementation of the first phase of 
the HTP. The first phase of the HTP was performed only in 
hospitals affiliated to the MoHME (except for covering people 
without basic health insurance). After the implementation 
of the third phase, no informal payment to physicians was 
found in the studied cases. During the third phase of the 
HTP, the book of the updated relative value units (RVU) of 
health services was issued and it was applied to all health 
centers across the country. Under this phase, the tariffs of 
most services increased dramatically. For example, the tariff 
of vaginal delivery changed from 15K (before the HTP) to 
50K (after the implementation of the third phase).50 Most 
physicians had complained about unrealistic tariffs system in 
the course of recent years, considering it as the main reason 
for receiving informal payments.21,22 In 2013, the percentage 
of informal payments to physicians was 2.0% in hospitals 
affiliated to the MoHME, 15.0% in private hospitals, 34.0% in 
Social Security hospitals, and 11.3% in all types of hospital.15
One study in Greece showed that in 2013, 74.4% of mothers 
who had used the childbirth services in the public sector were 
forced to practice informal payment.51 According to a survey 
conducted in Bulgaria in 2010, informal payments were 
reported even 10 years after the implementation of formal co-
payments for services in basic benefits package, which were 
designed to reduce unofficial payments. About 13.0% of the 
users of outpatient care and 33.0% of the users of inpatient 
care had reported unofficial payments.26 The results of a study 
in Serbia showed that 5.7% of health service users experienced 
informal payments.52
In our study, the proportion of informal payments to 
physicians, which was defined as a percentage of hospitalized 
patients’ OOP, was 10.1%, 16.4%, and 9.6% respectively 
in the hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, Social Security, 
and private sector before the implementation of the HTP. 
The rate changed to 0.0%, 13.0%, and 31.1%, respectively, 
after the implementation of the first phase of the HTP. This 
percentage dropped to zero and there were no reports of 
informal payments to physicians in the studied hospitals 
after the implementation of the third phase of the HTP. The 
estimates indicate that the informal payments in low-income 
countries account for 10.0% to 45.0% of the total OOP for 
health.25 A study conducted in 2013 in Iran (Urmia province 
in northwest of Iran) indicated that informal payments 
accounted for 15.0% of the total OOP to hospitals.15 
In our study, after the implementation of the HTP (as 
compared with the time before its implementation) there 
was a significant reduction in the number of patients referred 
to hospitals outside the MOHME hospital supply chain. In 
addition, the share of OOP payments out of hospital from the 
inpatient total OOP payments was significantly decreased. 
The observed share was 36% in MOHME hospitals before the 
implementation of the HTP which reduced to 2% after the 
implementation of the third phase of the HTP. Prior to the 
implementation of the HTP, patients admitted to the hospitals 
affiliated to the MoHME were occasionally referred to the 
centers out of the hospital to buy some medical supplies. 
Since these expenses were not recorded in hospital bills, they 
were not covered by basic health insurance organizations. 
Ghiasvand et al conducted a study in public hospitals in 
Tehran in 2012 and showed that 68.5% of the total OOP 
payments of patients out of the hospital was for the purchase 
of medicines, medical equipment, and diagnostic services.13 
In some studies, requesting patients to provide medical 
goods and equipment (which indeed must be provided by the 
hospitals) are considered as a type of informal payment.52 The 
other countries whose healthcare system is in transition have 
a similar condition.53 The payments for “bought and brought 
healthcare goods” are also observed in other countries.52
The extent and percentage of contribution of health insurance 
organizations in financing inpatient services have increased in 
all hospitals after the implementation of the HTP. The Iranian 
National Health Accounts of 2008 showed that the 3 main 
insurance organizations in Iran, ie, Iranian health insurance, 
social security, and armed forces insurance organizations, 
incurred 6.6%, 10.9%, and 1.5% of the total healthcare 
expenditures respectively, which indicated the inefficiency of 
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insurers in covering the costs of services.38 
Patients discharged from the hospitals after the initiation of 
the HTP, compared with those discharged from the hospitals 
before the HTP plan, had lower odd ratios for informal 
payments to the physicians, our research revealed. 
People discharged from the hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, 
compared with those discharged from other hospitals, had 
lower ORs for informal payments to physicians. This might 
be due to the implementation of the first phase of HTP in 
the hospitals affiliated to the MoHME, which enhanced the 
supervision of universities of medical sciences over these 
hospitals. The extent and percentage of informal payments 
to physicians in hospitals affiliated to the MoHME have 
been reported lower than that in other hospitals in Iran.15 
A Greek study showed that those who were hospitalized in 
private hospitals were 2.1 times more prone to pay bonuses to 
nurses than those hospitalized in public hospitals.27 A Turkish 
study also showed that the type of the ownership of the 
service provider had a significant relationship with informal 
payments.54
Residential location was one of the factors affecting informal 
payments to physicians. People living in rural areas were four 
times more prone to pay informally to physicians than those 
living in urban settings. A study conducted in Albania showed 
that the residential location was one of the factors influencing 
the volume of informal payments.54 This was also confirmed 
in an Iranian study.15
Hospitalized patients who received services from 
nephrologists, ophthalmologist, and otolaryngologists were 
more prone to informal payments to physicians, compared 
to patients who visited other specialists. A study in Iran 
showed that 90.0% of people who had informal payments 
to physicians were those who had undergone a surgery; 
moreover, general surgeons received the highest amount of 
informal payments (42.0%), followed by otolaryngology 
surgeons and maxillofacial surgeons (24.0%).15 A Greek study 
showed that people undergoing surgery were 137.0% more 
prone to informal payments than those who did not undergo 
surgery.27 
Patients living in the households with a monthly income of 
10 to 30 million Rial were less prone to informal payments 
while those with higher incomes had a higher chance for 
informal payments to physicians. An increase in average 
monthly household income may increase the volume of 
informal payments to physicians.15 Results of a study in 
Albania showed a weak relationship between income and the 
informal payments; however, it showed a positive relationship 
between the volume of informal payments and patients’ level 
of income.55
Our study showed that patients under the coverage of social 
security insurance were less prone to informal payments to 
physicians, in comparison to patients under the coverage 
of other insurance schemes. Despite higher percentage of 
informal payments to physicians in social security hospitals, 
patients covered by social security insurance were less prone 
to informal payments to physicians. This is due to the fact 
that the physicians in the social security hospitals had fewer 
requests for informal payments from people under the 
coverage of the social security insurance (3.5%) than those 
under the coverage of other insurance companies (8.6%). 
Previous researches showed no correlation between the 
informal payments and type of insurance.16,25 In our study, 
patients without any medical insurance were more likely to pay 
unofficially. The percentage of patients with supplementary 
insurance in the weakest and strongest income level group 
were 4.5% and 40.5% respectively, however, about 89.0% of 
people with informal payments to physicians were located in 
the poorest income groups.
Limitations
In this study, part of the data was collected through making 
phone calls. In some cases, due to the lack of access to landline 
or cell phone number of the patient or the patient’s family 
members, it was not possible to interview some of the subjects.
In our study, the samples were selected in proportion to the 
size of the hospitals in different sectors. As private hospitals 
had a very low share in the total number of patients discharged 
from hospitals, a very low number of patients were selected 
from this type of hospital. Accordingly, the results obtained 
for the private hospital should be interpreted with caution. 
Also, our collected data are prone to the risk of recall bias and 
a probability of over- or under-reporting of the costs paid by 
patients. Moreover, this study was carried out in Kurdistan 
province, west of Iran; hence, the results may not represent 
a full picture of formal and informal payments in the whole 
country.
Conclusion 
OOP has had a rising trend in the course of recent years and 
has accounted for over 50.0% of the total healthcare costs in 
Iran. High level of OOP might be due to the low share of the 
health budget in the public funds, inefficiencies of insurance 
organizations, receiving extra-tariff payments from patients, 
and referring patients out of the hospital for the purchase 
of medicines, equipment, and supplies. Due to the high 
proportion of OOP (formal and informal) and because of 
its negative effects on equity and access to health services, 
policy-makers have focused on and implemented HTP to 
reduce such payments. Based on our findings, it seems that 
the implementation of the HTP, at least in a short-run, has had 
a noticeable impact on the reduction of OOP expenditures 
and informal payments to physicians in Kurdistan province 
as compared with the time before the implementation of 
the HTP. This observation might have been caused by the 
transformation plan (as it was intended), however further 
research is required to assess the causality of the link between 
the reform the observed reductions in such payments in the 
short and long term periods.
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Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics of All the Variables Used in the Regression Model
Variables Have Informal Payment Number
No (%) Yes (%)
Period of the study
Before the HTP 251 (94.7) 14 (5.3) 265
After the first phase of HTP 261 (98.5) 4 (1.5) 265
After the third phase of HTP 265 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 265
Type of hospital
Affiliated to MoHME 638 (98.5) 10 (1.5) 648
Not affiliated to MoHME 139 (94.6) 8 (5.4) 147
Location
Urban 585 (98.7) 8 (1.3) 593
Rural 192 (95.1) 10 (4.9) 202
Type of basic insurance
Medical services 402 (97.3) 11 (2.7) 413
Social security 209 (98.6) 4 (1.4) 294
Armed forces 33 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 33
Relief and Welfare committee 42 (93.3) 3 (6.7) 45
Banks 4 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 4
Supplementary insurance
Not have 717 (97.8) 16 (2.2) 733
Have 60 (96.8) 2 (3.2) 62
Household income
<10 million Rial 496 (97.1) 15 (2.9) 511
10-30 million Rial 246 (99.6) 1 (0.4) 247
>30 million Rial 35 (94.6) 2 (5.4) 37
Specialty of the physician
Obstetrics and Gynecology 214 (98.2) 4 (1.8) 218
General surgery 87 (98.9) 1 (1.1) 88
Orthopaedic 50 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 50
Ophthalmology 51 (91.1) 5 (8.9) 56
Otorhinolaryngology 28 (93.3) 2 (6.7) 30
Urology 58 (90.6) 6 (9.4) 64
Pediatrics 59 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 59
Cardiology 43 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 43
Internal medicine 63 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 63
Pulmonology 21 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 21
Gastroenterology 13 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 13
Endocrinology 4 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 4
Hematology 6 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 6
Oncology 10 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 10
Neurology 0 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 45
Infectious disease 0 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 25
Type of treatment
With a surgery* 351 (95.4) 17 (4.6) 368
Without a surgery 426 (99.8) 1 (0.2) 427
Length of stay
1-2 day* 285 (96.0) 12 (4.0) 297
3-4 day 293 (98.7) 4 (1.3) 297
>5 day 199 (99.0) 2 (1.0) 201
Abbreviation: HTP, health transformation plan.
